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ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the challenges facing contem-
porary constitutionalism before the irreversibility of globalization and 
the prospect of global governance.  The goal of this article is to iden-
tify the proposals concerning the development of a global constitu-
tionalism, as well as analyze the limits and possibilities of proposed 
trans-constitutionalism as an alternative to establish juridical “dia-
logues” among different legal normative orders.  The study is justi-
fied, having in mind the need for re-contextualization of contempo-
rary constitutionalism, given the fragility of the concept of 
sovereignty and the multiplicity of regulatory sources, especially 
concerning the international protection of human rights.  Rationale 
inductive basis was the methodology used for reporting.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The objective of the present discourse about globalization is to 
analyze theoretical positions about the limits and possibilities to im-
prove global governance – which boosted the discussion of a global 
constitutionalism – while searching for a consensus between various 
political, cultural, and social interests that interact in transnational 
spaces.   
Therefore, this article begins by presenting some guidelines 
about globalization and covering approaches about its concept and 
evolutionary process to discuss the need to consider global govern-
ance. Once establishing a foundation of the globalization process and 
its irreversibility, this article will explore the theme of the conse-
quences of this process in contemporary constitutionalism.  Conse-
quences resulting from the fragility of the concept of sovereignty and 
the multiplicity of regulatory sources, especially in regard to interna-
tional protection of human rights, contemporary constitutionalism 
needs to reframe its field in the political and transnational legal space.  
 Finally, this article focuses on the limits and possibilities of the 
theoretical alternative trans-constitutionalism developed by Marcelo 
Neves in Brazil. This article shows mainly the limits and possibilities 
regarding the need for “dialogue” and interaction among different ju-
risdictions in solving common constitutional issues and going beyond 
the state’s borders national. 
1. Guidelines About Globalization and Global Governance 
Before extrapolating the problems facing contemporary constitu-
tionalism, it is important to draw some guidelines about globalization 
and global governance.  The reason for this is because these phenom-
ena have been converging for a disruption of paradigms that directly 
affect the national state (and consequently the theoretical basis that 
sustains it – modern constitutionalism), it is necessary to resize the 
approach regarding its scope and limits.3 
The term “globalization” is used by Anthony Giddens to refer to 
“processes that are intensifying relations and local social interde-
pendence.”4 Among the factors contributing to its development, Gid-
 
 3. ANTHONY GIDDENS, SOCIOLOGIA 61 (Artmed ed, 4th, 2005). 
 4. GIDDENS, supra note 3. 
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dens detaches the expansion of global communications, the develop-
ment of a global economy model (evidenced by transnational corpo-
rations), political changes, and the appearance and implementation of 
regional mechanisms and international governance.5  
Giddens, using the classification developed by David Held, dis-
cusses three theoretical positions about the understanding of the 
globalization phenomenon: the skeptics, the hyper-globalizers, and 
the transformationalists.6  The skeptics minimize the consequences of 
globalization, especially from the economic point of view.7  Despite 
admitting greater commercial interaction with other countries, skep-
tics assert this would not be sufficient to characterize a globalized 
economy, considering the primary focus is put on regional blocks 
with heavy reliance on national regulations.8  The hyper-globalizers, 
in turn, maximize the effects of globalization that would be responsi-
ble for creating a new global order regardless of frontiers, leading to 
the disappearance of the nation-state.9  In turn, the transformational-
ists see beyond the economic aspect of the phenomenon, taking into 
consideration its political and cultural character; they conceive it as a 
dynamic process, open and constantly liable to changes in which the 
Nation-States do not lose their sovereignty, but restructure it.10 
When dealing with the legal production in the context of globali-
zation, Maurizio Oliviero and Paulo Márcio Cruz also seem to adopt 
this “transformationalist” stance when they admit the wear of modern 
constitutional state paradigm – focused on the monopoly of rules 
produced by the sovereign state.11  However, rightly, Oliviero and 
Cruz do not speak in “overcoming” of the state law, but in “transfor-
mation” of the legal production by the state, which should suit the 
content of the legislative and constitutional formulations to the new 
 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
 10. OCTAVIO IANNI, A ERA DO GLOBALISMO 36 (Civilização Brasileira, 1996) (It is adopted 
on the conducting of this work the transformationalist conception of globalization, that 
“rhymes with the integration and with homogenization the same way as with differen-
tiation and fragmentation [...] The same forces that promote integration arouse antago-
nism”). 
 11. Id. 
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external normative references.12  Regarding the impacts of globaliza-
tion within legal production, Oliviero and Cruz conclude that it 
“modifies its historical characters and assumes two outer lines: the 
absence of a ‘stable territorial relationship,’ on the one hand, and plu-
ralism of legal systems of reference, on the other.”13 
Whichever the position adopted, more heretical or extremist, the 
fact is that while the phenomenon of globalization progresses, “exist-
ing structures and political models reveal themselves unprepared to 
manage a full risk world, inequalities and challenges that transcend 
national boundaries.”14  In this sense, it starts to speak of governance 
that transcends the nation-state towards the creation of a global dem-
ocratic structure. 
Ulrich Beck also approximates his concept of globalization (or 
globality) to Anthony Giddens’ when he takes the mutual strengthen-
ing of relations across national boundaries as a basic presupposition.15  
By analyzing the process of globalization, Beck believes that the 
transition from the national state to the transnational era will be pos-
sible by means of a new configuration of political space, that is, by 
overcoming the idea of separate worlds or “monocentric power struc-
ture” by a model of “polycentric distribution of power in which a 
wide range of transnational and national actors to cooperate and 
compete with each other.”16  Given the irreversible globalization 
framework, nation-states see their sovereignty, their identity and their 
sphere of power, irremediably under the interdependence of transna-
tional actors.17   
Thus, the approach to a global governance is justified, because of 
the globalization process, especially in the face of the nation-state ba-
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Maurizio Oliviero & Paulo Márcio Cruz, Fundamentos de direito transnacional, in 
DIREITO GLOBAL: TRANSNACIONALIDADE E GLOBALIZAÇÃO JURÍDICA 34-35 (Alexandre 
Morais da Rosa & Márcio Ricardo Staffen eds., Univali, 2013). 
 14. GIDDENS, supra note 3, at 78.  
 15. ULRICH BECK, O QUE É GLOBALIZAÇÃO? EQUÍVOCOS AO GLOBALISMO: RESPOSTAS À 
GLOBALIZAÇÃO 34 (1999). 
 16. “And the German professor continues: “There are therefore two arenas of global socie-
ties: the society of the States where the main variables remain to be the rules of diplo-
macy and national power and the world of transnational sub-politics, which houses the 
most disparate actors, as international companies, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, 
in addition to the World Bank, NATO, EU etc.” Id. at 35. 
 17. Id. at 30.  
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sis: modern constitutional law is evidenced by the concept of sover-
eignty crisis, in view of the proliferation of regulatory sources and 
decision-making bodies that transcend national borders.  
 In this context, Andreas Osiander18 also alerts to the sovereign 
crisis in its modern concept.  With the expansion of globalization, 
“modern states are also tied into a complex structure of governance 
that creates a network of cooperation and mutual restraint,” whose 
participation, although “voluntary” is presented by the irreversible 
costs that the non-participation of States in this process might entail.19  
In 2006, a study group of the International Law Commission of 
the United Nations presented a report on the fragmentation of interna-
tional law and the difficulties arising from its diversification and ex-
pansion.20  The group concluded, “one aspect of globalization is the 
emergence of technically specialized cooperation networks with a 
global scope.”21  The dynamics involving specialized spheres of life 
such as “trade, environment, human rights, diplomacy, communica-
tion, medicine, crime prevention, energy production, security, [and] 
indigenous cooperation,”22 demand levels of cooperation and integra-
tion that go beyond national borders and dare international law.  The 
dynamics show themselves to be insufficient to generate effective 
governance mechanisms, given the transnational nature of these net-
works.23 
As a result, these “cooperation networks” tend to develop their 
own rules and/or systems of rules by means of harmonization of na-
tional and regional laws, which results in the appearance of interna-
tional treaties and organizations tailored to the needs and interests of 
each network at the regional level; therefore, fragmented on an inter-
national point of view.24  This fragmentation of international law en-
tails “the rise of specialized rules and rule-systems that have no clear 
 
 18. Andreas Osiander, Sovereignity, international relations, and the Westphalian Myth, 
55(2) INT’L ORG. 283 (2001).  
 19. Id. 
 20. Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising From the Diversification and 
Expansion of International Law, Rep. of the Study Grp. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 58th 
Sess., May 1 - June 9, July 11 - Aug. 6, 2011, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 
2006) [hereinafter Fragmentation].  
 21. Fragmentation, supra note 20, at ¶ 481.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at ¶ 482.  
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relationship to each other . . . [a]nswers to legal questions become 
dependent on whom you ask, what rule-system is your focus on.”25   
It is urgent that an analysis of the limits and possibilities of im-
proving global governance be completed. According to Cynthia 
Hewitt de Alcántara, the term governance refers to the existence of a 
political process that “involves building consensus, or obtaining the 
consent or acquiescence necessary to carry out a programme, in an 
arena where many different interests are in play.”26 
It is therefore beyond the nation-state that the challenges of con-
temporary constitutionalism are presented and the discussion of glob-
al constitutionalism becomes articulated at the global level. In this 
sense, “[g]lobal constitutionalism is an agenda that identifies and ad-
vocates for the application of constitutionalist principles in the inter-
national legal sphere.”27  Despite the criticism about the empirical re-
ality of this proposition, as well as the impossibility of legitimacy that 
it seems to have, global constitutionalism can reduce the failure of 
national constitutional law and even serve as a hermeneutics proposal 
for a national constitutional law approach when faced with interna-
tional law, especially when dealing with interactional protection of 
human rights. 
Anne Peters,28 examining the merits of such a proposal and tak-
ing into account the legitimacy and the democratic deficit inherent in 
the question, warns that “global constitutionalism should not be used 
to bestow false legitimacy on international law, nor should the com-
plaint that international law lacks legitimacy undermine the authority 
of international law as such.”29  From the foregoing, it follows that 
the process of globalization and discussions about the (im)possibility 
of a global governance challenges contemporary constitutionalism; 
that given the fragility of the concept of sovereignty and multiplicity 
of regulatory sources, especially, in what refers to international pro-
tection of human rights. 
 
 25. Id. at ¶ 483.   
 26. Cynthia Hewitt de Alcántara, Uses and Abuses of the Concept of Governance, 155 
INT’L SOC. SCI. J., 105 (1998).  
 27. Anne Peters, The Merits of Global Constitutionalism, 16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
409, 410 (2009). 
 28. Id. at  409.   
 29. Id. at 410.  
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2. The Weakness of the Concept of Sovereignty and the 
“Problem” of Contemporary Constitutionalism 
The history of the development of the notion of sovereignty is 
confusing, on a large scale, with the development of international 
law.  The Peace of Westphalia, which brought an end to the Thirty 
Years’ War in 1648, added a new chapter in state sovereignty in the 
history of international law.30  Before the Thirty Years’ War, the Eu-
ropean world of Christianity was largely dominated by the power 
struggle between popes and emperors.31  As a result of its defeat, the 
Holy Roman Empire was dissolved in hundreds of relatively inde-
pendent authorities that started to exercise sovereignty over their 
populations and territories.  This theoretically marked the birth of the 
modern nation-state system.32 
The doctrine of sovereignty has evolved gradually with the 
changes in the fundamentals of its legitimacy.  With the overcoming 
of absolutism and the emergence of the constitutional modern state, 
the idea of sovereignty has shifted and transitioned from an absolute 
meaning to a democratic dimension, based on the formula “we the 
peoples.”33  The modern concept of sovereignty implies, in the broad 
sense “the power of control of a final instance, in a political society 
and, consequently, the difference between this and other human asso-
ciations which organization cannot find that supreme power, exclu-
sive, non-derivative.”34  This dimension of sovereignty, which gives 
the nation-state total independence in face of any external power, has 
become the hallmark of the modern constitutional state.35  
Currently, to set or even unravel the nature of the category “sov-
ereignty” is an arduous task, considering that only supporting the 
concept as the effective state control capacity is insufficient, but in a 
certain way still needed to form within the international system. 
By analyzing the constitutional modern state and its vicissitudes, 
Paulo Marcio Cruz points out the weakness of the concept of sover-
 
 30. Winston P. Nagant & Joshua L. Root, The Emerging Restrictions on Sovereign Im-
munity: Premptory Norms of International Law, the U.N. Charter, and the Application 
of Modern Communications Theory, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 388 (2013).  
 31. Id.  
 32. Id. at 406-7.  
 33. Id. at 387.   
 34. NORBERTO BOBBIO, DICIONÁRIO DE POLÍTICA 1179 (5th ed. 2000).  
 35. Nagant & Root, supra note 30, at 377-78.  
Globalization, Global Governance, and Challenges Vol. IV, No. II 
 9 
eignty due to integration and globalization and attends to the need to 
overcome the modern concept of sovereignty.36  There is already con-
sensus that state sovereignty, in its modern sense, can be an obstacle 
to international protection of human rights, as well as to the effec-
tiveness of international law.  This is so unless there is a change of 
doctrinal focus of the sovereignty category seen as a component of a 
constitutive process of the wider world, which would encompass the 
idea of an “interdependent sovereignty.”37 
Matteucci notes the eclipse of the political-legal concept of sov-
ereignty based on the conclusion of the predominance of constitu-
tional theories and de-constitution of the modern state, as a unique 
and autonomous center of power, considering the pluralistic reality of 
democratic societies.38  In this approach, there is no way to ignore the 
interdependence of states in international relations that gradually in-
tensifies in the global environment under various hues, mitigating the 
border limits.  There is no need to talk about full state power or that 
this power is fading, only that it is disappearing as “a particular form 
of power organization, which had its strong point in the political-
legal concept of sovereignty.”39   
Faced with the need to focus the debate on the international 
promotion and protection of human rights, the nation-state’s sover-
eignty idea still suffers another shift, which can be observed in three 
fields.  First, in the field of international organization, states already 
recognize that organizations like the UN or the European Union may 
make decisions on issues that they no longer have a decisive influ-
ence.40  Second, states already recognize the jurisdiction (especially 
on human rights) of regional and international judicial institutions, 
and accept that citizens can resort to such bodies.41  Third, in the con-
flict and foreign intervention field, states tend to accept the relativity 
 
 36. PAULO MÁRCIO CRUZ, DA SOBERANIA À TRANSNACIONALIDADE: DEMOCRACIA, DIREITO 
E ESTADO NO SÉCULO XXI 85 (Univali, 2011).   
 37. MAURY ROBERTO VIVIANI, CONSTITUCIONALISMO GLOBAL: CRÍTICA EM FACE DA 
REALIDADE DAS RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS NO CENÁRIO DE UMA NOVA ORDEM MUNDIAL 
106 (2014).  
 38. Nicola Matteucci, Comentários ao verbete “Soberania,” in DICIONÁRIO DE POLÍTICA 
1189 (5th ed. 2000(2).   
 39. Id.  
 40. Masahiro Miyoshi, Sovereignty and International Law (Feb. 11, 2015), 
https://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/conferences/sos/masahiro_miyoshi_paper.pdf. 
 41. Id. 
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of their sovereignty for the protection of people who eventually suf-
fered serious human rights violations.42 
In other words, issues that were previously considered to be ex-
clusively within state purview and the exercise of their sovereignty 
are now performed based on the integration between states through 
international organizations, multilateral instruments, and integrated 
communities.43  Cruz emphasizes that this trans-national “integration” 
goes beyond a simple cooperation.44  The constitutional modern state 
not only contracts binding obligations under international treaties, but 
also submits to external bodies’ control as the observance thereof, 
transferring powers, including jurisdiction, of such authorities.45 
Canotilho notes that the constitutional political preconditions are 
outside the national and state space.46  In this sense, even if the con-
stitutions continue to represent the “Magna Carta of national identi-
ty,” their normative force must yield “before new political-
organizational phenotypes, and fit, in the political terms and in legis-
lative terms, on the regulative schemes of the new open associations 
of open national states.”47  The rise of non-state international actors 
shows the decline of the traditional concept of sovereignty and im-
poses the challenge to contemporary constitutionalism to re-
contextualize before cross-border regulatory claims.48  It is clear that 
the instruments, as well as the jurisdiction of international protection 
of human rights tend to expand.  Especially because, according to 
Bardie,49 “to promote human rights around the world is both a moral 
obligation and the reflected conviction that the offense that it is made 
a part of the world reacts on somewhere that goes beyond the borders 
of sovereignty.”50 
 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id.  
 44. CRUZ, supra note 36, at 90. 
 45. Id. at 11.  
 46. J.J. GOMES CANOTILHO, “BRANCOSOS” E INTERCONSTITUCIONALIDADE: ITINERÁRIOS 
DOS DISCURSOS SOBRE A HISTORICIDADE CONSTITUCIONAL, 109-10 (Almedina, 2d ed. 
2008). 
 47. Id.  
 48. BERTRAND BADIE, UM MUNDO SEM SOBERANIA 28 (Piaget, 1999). 
 49. Id. at 176.  
 50. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, UNIV. DENVER PAPERS 10-11 
(2004), http://mysite.du.edu/~jdonnell/papers/hrsov%20v4a.htm. 
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This urgent need to carry out the international protection of hu-
man rights imposes certain challenges to contemporary constitution-
alism.  Anne Peters points to four important elements of constitution-
alism, when considering the feasibility of a discussion about a global 
constitutionalism: 
1) The sovereignty of the State is no longer the rule of in-
ternational law, which becomes re-contextualized in a hori-
zontal system of “juxtaposed actors” guided by the respon-
sibility to protect human rights;  
2) The principle of State decision needs to be replaced by 
a majority decision process, however, the representation of 
the most populous States results in the overall representation 
inequality;  
3) The widespread ratification of international treaties for 
the protection of human rights, climate, and even free trade 
does not necessarily reflect genuine commitments, but it is 
often the result of imbalances and power maneuvers;  
4) The international dispute resolution is given by an al-
most compulsory adherence to jurisdiction international 
courts, being that the legalization of these decisions have 
clear constitutional aspects.51 
Given this turn, by analyzing the European context, Canotilho 
presents his proposal for the theory of inter-constitutionality that 
“studies the inter-constitutional competitive relationship, conver-
gence, juxtaposition and conflicts of various constitutions and various 
constituent powers in the same political space.”52  Canotilho points 
out the need to break dominant paradigms in referencing the “consti-
tution state” to overcome theories of isolated “constitutional mo-
ments” and permutation of a “hierarchical-normative” scheme of 
constitutional law “by a multipolar system of constitutional govern-
ance.”53 
Gunther Teubner notes that the constitutional issues that arise 
beyond the nation-state and out of institutionalized politics raised the 
debate about the crisis of modern constitutionalism, which is divided 
 
 51. Peters, supra note 27, at 398-99. 
 52. Canotilho, supra note 46, at 265-66. 
 53. Id.   
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into arguments about transnational constitutionalism “whose status – 
social theory, issue of constitutional law, political manifesto, social 
utopia – remains nuclear.”54  According to the Teubner, both theoreti-
cal positions, which are polarized, attest to the decline of modern 
constitutionalism because of trans-nationalization.55 Some argue that 
modern constitutionalism, which historically developed from nation-
state constitutions, has overshadowed its base with the advent of the 
European Union, the transnational regimes, and the transfer of politi-
cal power to private actors.56  They argue alternatives to the national 
constitution cannot be found in the transnational political space that 
lack representativeness, cultural hegemony, and public deliberation.57  
Thus, the response to the crisis would be the re-nationalization or re-
politicization.58  However, according to Teubner, others argue for a 
new democratic constitutionalism, which could serve as a compensa-
tory to regulate the dynamics of global capitalism under the aegis of 
constitutional global politics.59 
Globalization and its destructive effects such as, environmental 
degradation, ethnic-religious conflicts with extraterritorial effects, the 
search for energy sources, poverty, and inequality are responsible for 
the phenomenon of migration, and has led to a downsizing of consti-
tutionalism at the global level which aims to be, to some extent, a 
universal regulatory speech.60  However, resizing of constitutionalism 
in a global level takes effect on the national legal systems of nation-
states, especially, on the interpretation and application of law by the 
courts that face the dichotomy between the principle of constitutional 
supremacy and compliance with the principles of international law, 
endangering two of the most important dogmas that Hans Kelsen has 
developed: the stepped structure of the legal system and the monistic 
theory of international law.61 
 
 54. Gunther Teubner, Constitutionalising Polycontexturalityy, SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 1 
(2010), http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/42852930/constitutionalisingpolycontexturality_eng.pdf.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 2.  
 59. Teubner, supra note 54, at 2. 
 60. Id. at 3.  
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Given the weakening of modern constitutionalism marked by the 
transfer of political power and government responsibilities of nation-
states to trans-national organizations the question remains whether 
constitutionalism is at the end or if there is a need to talk about re-
birth or reframing.62 
In this sense, Teubner deals with the false premise of starting at 
an empty transnational constitution and transferring the effective dis-
cussion of a global constitutionalism, given that constitutional institu-
tions have already settled in the international sphere with amazing 
density, becoming part of a global, although fragmented, constitu-
tional order.63 Teubner disagrees with creating a new global constitu-
tional order, and would rather have a transformation of a transnation-
al constitutional order already in force.64  The current constitutional 
question is how to identify the actual structures of the existing global 
constitutionalism, criticize its shortcomings, and formulate realistic 
proposals for rules limiting its power.65 
Constitutionalism can be studied from its earliest roots with the 
Hebrews, from the plurality of the medieval period to the modern de-
velopment.  However, as Fioravant notes, there isn’t one constitu-
tionalism.66  There are various doctrines about the constitution, with 
the intention that it may theoretically represent the existence of an 
order for society and its powers.67  In this sense, the contemporary 
constitutionalism faces the challenge of being “a constitutional right 
that has exceeded the frontiers of the respective States and has be-
come directly relevant to other jurisdictions, including non-state 
 
61. Alexandre Douglas Zaidan de Carvalho, Transconstitucionalism or Cosmopolitanism: 
Perspectives for a Dialogical Semantics in Contemporary Constitucionalism, SOC. SCI. 
RES. (Feb. 10, 2015, 9:00 AM), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474144. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Teubner, supra note 54 at 19.  
 64. Id. at 4-6. 
 65. For a more complete accurate analysis about the global constitutionalism trends, see, 
in Portuguese: André Basto Lupi, Mário João Ferreira Monte & Maury Roberto Vivi-
ani, Em Busca de Fundamentos para o Constitucionalismo Global: Esboço de 
Tendências Teóricas para a Constitucionalização no Âmbitoâmbito de Uma Nova Or-
dem Mundial, in DIREITO E TRANSNACIONALIZAÇÃO (Univali, 2013). 
 66. MAURIZIO FIORAVANTE, CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA ANTIGÜEDAD A NUESTROS DÍAS 12 
(Trotta, 2001). 
 67. Id.  
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ones.”68  An alternative analysis, developed by Marcelo Neves in 
Brazil, addresses the theoretical perspective of trans-
constitutionalism and the dialogue between legal systems.69  This 
theory examines its limits and possibilities as an alternative to deal 
with constitutional issues beyond the borders of the nation-state, and 
its actual use, specifically, by the Supreme Brazilian Federal Court. 
3. Limits and Possibilities of the Trans-constitutionalism 
Theoretical Alternative and the “Dialogue” Among 
Jurisdictions. 
“No one, I think, will dispute the fact of a global system,”70 this 
is how Niklas Luhmann starts his famous essay on globalization.71  
As discussed earlier, before the irreversibility of the phenomenon of 
globalization and insurgency of transnational normative places, the 
national state overcame the notion of sovereignty developed after the 
Peace of Westphalia and did without tools for mediation between law 
and politics.72  Instead, it utilized the direct action of judges and 
courts, especially in matters relating to the protection of human 
rights, which promoted an exchange (dialogue) of common herme-
neutical experience. 
Brazilian Minister of the Supreme Court, Cezar Peluso, reaf-
firmed this resizing of the relationship between law and politics in 
contemporary constitutionalism, and the need for dialogue between 
national and international decision-making bodies dealing with con-
stitutional issues at the opening of the World Conference on Constitu-
tional Justice.73  The Minister pointed out that legal operations are in-
creasingly acquiring trans-national character, “the growing 
interdependence among nations now requires dual challenge to na-
tional judiciaries.  On the one hand, there is frequent interaction with 
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regulatory systems of other nations. On the other, bridges are built 
between autonomous legal systems.”74 
In this context, and specifically in Brazil, Marcelo Neves devel-
ops his theory of the trans-constitutionalism.75  He proposes more 
than a “dialogue,” in the sense of understanding or consensus be-
tween different legal systems,76 but a communication guided by a 
“double contingency” in plan of constitutional problems (which are 
presented beyond the legal proceedings, also in international, supra-
national, and transnational private actors’ organizations): cross com-
munications that would result in reciprocal learning.77  Under this 
systemic point of view, the state is characterized by a division of ju-
risdiction control horizontally distributed and that this process is cap-
tured in the interpretive process of law, especially in the constitution-
al field based on the theory developed by Hans Kelsen that places the 
constitution at the top of the legal system hierarchy.78 In this sense, 
the constitution outlines the limits and shapes of the interpretative 
role of constitutional courts. 
The Latin American culture, according to Flavia Piovesan, 
adopted a legal paradigm with three characteristics:  
(a) the prevalence of the theoretical framework of Hans 
Kelsen, based on the supremacy of the constitution–
although the Austrian author defends a theory of monism 
with primacy of international law;  (b) hermeticism of a le-
 
 74. Id. 
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espoused by Marcelo Neves in his thesis at the University of Largo de São Francisco 
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gal science strictly normative; and  (c) state approach, based 
on structural concepts from the nation-state.79  
Marcelo Neves, in this point, does not neglect the importance of 
the constitution when he mentions that, “the constitutional sentence,” 
normatively subjected to the constitution, he says, “making it happen, 
which is constitutional.”80  However, Hans Kelsen’s hierarchical 
model interpretation does not seem to be the most useful when it 
comes to decisions about human rights, which can be introduced by 
national tribunals, international tribunals, or both.  When it comes to 
human or fundamental rights, Neves clarifies that the path must be 
the “joint model” or the “interweaving of legal systems, so that all 
present themselves able to rebuild itself permanently by learning” be-
tween legal systems interested in solving the same constitutional 
problems.81  Here, Neves passes to make use of the “intertwined hier-
archies” concept developed by Douglas Hofstadter in specifying that 
the constitution, even if put as “core of self-foundation normative of 
the State” and constitute inviolable core, “can be involved, in the dy-
namic constitutional game, with other levels (interlaced) in a super-
intertwined level.”82  In this sense, the constitution is permanently re-
constructed through interpretation processes. 
The trans-constitutionalism becomes an alternative theory built 
to handle the increasing fragmentation of the law and international 
law when confronted with the possibility of a relationship among di-
verse legal orders.83  In this sense, the theory describes the possibility 
of dialogue based on the “structural coupling” and “transition bridg-
es” among transverse legal rationales, as a complex approach, to deal 
with the constitutional issues they share.84 
Couplings are selective filtering mechanisms between systems’ 
structures suffering reciprocal influence, allowing structural changes 
between these partial systems without losing their autonomy.85  In 
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this sense, these are examples of structural couplings: the university 
(coupling between education and science), art galleries (coupling be-
tween art and economics), and public opinion (coupling between 
politics and mass media).86  With regard to the science of law, the 
constitution is the coupling between the legal and political systems.87 
The proposal Neves’ suggests is to build “transition bridges” be-
tween cross rationalities, going beyond the notion of a constitution as 
a mere structural coupling, but instead as an “instance of mutual and 
lasting relationship of learning and exchange of experience with par-
ticular conceptions already processed, respectively, in politics and 
law.”88  These “transition bridges” between several partial rationali-
ties would avoid the danger of “atomization” (which would cause the 
insulation and the crystallization of state orders in its own sovereign-
ty) and “imperial expansion” (little reflective global constitutionalism 
on local and regional differences with excessive imposition of only 
one discursive sphere).89 
The prospect of Marcelo Neves, in proposing this network of co-
operation between legal perspectives, is guided by the need for pro-
tection of human rights internationally. In this sense, Flavia Piovesan 
identified that Latin American constitutions already “establish consti-
tutional clauses that allow interaction between the constitutional or-
der and the international order, extending and expanding the constitu-
tionality block.”90 
The Brazilian model of the compatibility control of domestic 
legislation with the constitution is a hybrid, covering both the diffuse 
control of constitutionality, in which any judge or court may declare 
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the unconstitutionality of a certain legal norm (American model), as 
well as concentrated control, in which the Brazilian Supreme Court 
focuses the power to review the constitutionality of laws passed by 
the Parliament (European model).  After recent changes in constitu-
tional texts in Latin America, it is possible to realize the development 
by both the doctrine and jurisprudence, and from another control pa-
rameter: the conventionality.91 
The conventionality control demands that the courts proceed to 
the analyze vertical compliance of law “not only with the 
[c]onstitution as a paradigm, but also with international treaties (es-
pecially human rights, but not only them) ratified by the government 
into effect in the country.”92  The development of conventionality 
control is concomitant with the change process of Latin American 
constitutions occurring in recent decades, when these began giving 
special and differentiated treatment to human rights.  Thus, specifi-
cally, in Latin America the “constitutional process of international 
law is combined with the process of internationalization of constitu-
tional law.”93 
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution, in Article 5º, Paragraph 2º, es-
tablishes that the rights and guarantees expressed in the constitution 
do not exclude other rights stemming from international treaties rati-
fied by Brazil.94  That constitution was amended in 2004 to include 
Paragraph 3º of Article 5º, establishing that international treaties and 
conventions on human rights that are approved by the National Con-
gress, may be equivalent to the following constitutional amendments:  
The Argentine Constitution, after the constitutional reform in 
1994, article 75, item 22 establishes that while treaties generally have 
supra-legal hierarchy, the protection of human rights treaties have 
constitutional status;  The 1993 Peruvian Constitution states that con-
stitutional rights must be interpreted in accordance with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and with international treaties rectified 
by the country (Peruvian Constitutional Court decision recorded in 
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2005 supports the thesis of the constitutional status of international 
treaties about human rights);  The 1991 Colombian Constitution, after 
the reform in 1997, in article 93 confers special hierarchy to human 
rights treaties in the domestic system.  The 1980 Chilean Constitu-
tion, renovated in 1989, has standardized the need that the State has 
to respect the rights and guarantees presented in international and du-
ly ratified treaties.95 
In Latin America specifically, it is evident that constitutional 
work aims to ensure a greater effectiveness of international treaties to 
protect human rights, which it verifies in three characteristics:  
a) at the apex of the legal system are the Constitution and 
international human rights treaties;   
b) the “openness” of law marked by dialogue between ju-
risdictions redefining domestic legal experience;   
c) the human rights approach replacing the state approach, 
reinforcing and consecrating popular sovereignty and secu-
rity at the national level.96 
Aware of this new approach to Latin American constitutional-
ism, the proposal of Marcelo Neves is the reaffirmation of a coopera-
tive exchange between legal perspectives, which have been entered 
into the orders issued by national and international courts, to the ex-
tent that common cases to various legal systems could be addressed 
together.97  What trans-constitutionalism therefore proposes, “is the 
intertwining of various legal systems, both state and transnational and 
supranational institutions, around the same problems of constitutional 
nature.”98  In Neves’ approach, the trans-constitutionalism between 
legal systems can take place between public international law and 
state law; between supranational law and state law; between state le-
gal systems; between state and transnational legal systems; between 
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state legal systems and extra-states local orders; and between supra-
national law and international law.99 
 A practical example of trans-constitutionalism between interna-
tional order and state order can be seen in the relationship between 
the Inter-American Human Rights System, established by the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights– Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica 
(“ACHR”) and the constitutional orders of the signatory states. 
The ACHR established the list of rights that must be respected 
and guaranteed by the member states-parties and for this purpose, the 
Convention established two monitoring bodies: the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights,100 the latter with advisory and contentious jurisdiction.  
In this context, trans-constitutionalism is not just an enforcement of 
the decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(“IACHR”) to national courts with constitutional jurisdiction, but al-
so a catalyst for national courts to begin to revise its case law based 
on the IACHR’s decisions, extending the application of contract law 
by the courts.101 
The first Brazilian case in this vein emerged when the question 
of conflict between Article 7, n. 7 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights and Article 5, LXVII, of the Brazilian Constitution 
was submitted to the Brazilian Supreme Court.102  The clash of norms 
resides in the fact that the institute for civil arrest of an unfaithful 
trustee has been included in the Brazilian constitutional provision as 
permitted, while the Convention prohibits it.  
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In December 2008, the Brazilian Supreme Court103 decided by 
majority that international human rights treaties, if not incorporated 
into national law by force of constitutional amendment force (special 
legislative procedure), assume supra-legal status, but at the same time 
are considered infra-constitutional.104  The argument in favor of the 
supra-legal hierarchy as ratified by the Convention serves as a basis 
of the decision of the Brazilian Supreme Court; in the sense that, alt-
hough the Federal Constitution permits the civil imprisonment of an 
unfaithful trustee, the infra-law could freely decide about their conti-
nuity or prohibition, taking into account the primacy of international 
standard in face of internal infra-constitutional legislation.105  The de-
cision represents the solution of a conflict that resizes the internal va-
lidity of the ACHR in order to expand the rights constitutionally es-
tablished in Brazilian law.  The decision therefore placed “in the 
foreground the effort for the formation of a cross-rationality, which 
shows itself as bearable for both legal parties involved.”106  In addi-
tion, trans-constitutionalism working with other state legal systems 
made this evident in recent decisions applied by the Brazilian Federal 
Supreme Court.  In Latin America, there is still a tradition of refer-
ences to devices, judgments, and foreign constitutional doctrines.  
While Brazilian constitutional law has been strongly marked by the 
U.S. constitutional model, it is also possible to see the influence of 
European constitutionalism in the resolution of constitutional con-
flicts.107 
An emblematic case is the judgment of Habeas Corpus 
82434/RS, adjudicated on November 17, 2003, which featured “as 
racist crime to publish books with anti-Semitic content (denial of the 
existence of the Holocaust).”108  In the reasoning of the decision, the 
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Brazilian Supreme Court invoked the foreign constitutional jurispru-
dence, which was fundamental to the debate109 for the demarcation of 
the matter.110 
Having made these points, it should be noted what the limits to 
trans-constitutionalism approach are.  The question is whether there 
is a competent body or organization to address issues involving the 
“legal systems of entanglement” and how to find a legitimate way for 
the internal adequacy of decisions, based on external elements, while 
the constitutional theory insists to claim the national state sovereign-
ty.111  Another crucial issue to watch is the constant invocation of the 
case law of other jurisdictions, which may give rise to the already 
lived historical episode of “colonialism” in the field of Latin Ameri-
can legal culture.112 
For trans-constitutionalism, it is necessary to renounce the ulti-
mate primacy of either order, defining as a legitimating condition the 
fact that there is no law, including public international law itself, 
which can be presented as the last discursive reason.113  The “uncriti-
cal importation of legislative and doctrinal models” can still give rise 
to “an inadequate incorporation of precedents.”114   
If trans-constitutionalism has brought a “crusade constitutional 
fertilization,” in the understanding and integration between jurisdic-
tions facing constitutional problems that are common, then the “dia-
logue between jurisdictions” proposed here entails a necessary criti-
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cal framework for the development of national constitutional law, as 
well as for the effectiveness of human rights.115 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
This article sought to establish parameters for the study of glob-
alization and to organize a brief overview of some theoretical trends 
that attempt to face the challenges of global governance with reper-
cussions in political theory and contemporary constitutional law.  We 
conclude that the trans-constitutional discussion regarding the shock 
of different normative orders at the global level is the result of global-
ization.  This context presents the theoretical weaknesses of the Latin 
American legal paradigm essentially positivist and sometimes insen-
sitive to contingencies and demands of political, social, and legal 
processes that transcend the boundaries of the nation-state. 
In this perspective, and given the growing insurgency of interna-
tional actors both in rules production and in governing policy, the 
myth of sovereignty is checked.  The irreversibility of globalization 
and the search for consensus between different rationalities have in-
ternational protection of human rights at its point of convergence.  
Thus, international protection of human rights emerges at the point of 
convergence of the irreversibility of globalization and the search for 
consensus between different rationalities.  
The markedly asymmetric world society makes relevant negative 
conditions to the completion of trans-constitutionalism as a norma-
tive-functional requirement on a global scale.  As stated by Gunther 
Teubner, “In the sea of globality, there are only islands of constitu-
tionality.”116  The development of cross rationalities between legal 
systems faces a number of obstacles both in the development of the 
national legal systems and outside of state political communities. 
In the external plan, the colonization process of right by other 
social systems (economy and politics) makes the law, and the global 
public sphere itself, an instrument for the benefit of the upmarket lex.  
However, the process is a detriment to the legal protection and human 
rights policy, and it precludes the “trans-national dialogue” for its ef-
fective applicability.  International law remains subject to the logic of 
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power by the political asymmetry between states, which precludes the 
consensus in the plural public sphere of trans-constitutionalism. 
In regards to protection of human rights, the functional require-
ment of global regulation of the legal system exceeds state borders 
and the discussion about the possibility of a global constitutionalism 
or lack thereof becomes relevant.  Internally, the difficulties of trans-
constitutionalism are characterized by asymmetric “forms of law,” 
that is, the ways in which the right relates to decision criteria.  Deci-
sion criteria spans, but is not limited to customary and positive stand-
ards and judicial precedents, principles, and activism; a fact observed 
particularly in the countries of late modernity.  In such countries, the 
social complexity is both deconstructive and self-destructive. 
Upon analysis, from the trans-constitutionalism theory, there is a 
possibility of unique processes of “dialogue between different consti-
tutional jurisdictions,” with the starting point being the protection of 
human rights in a scenario that is developing beyond traditional na-
tional boundaries. 
It remains that there is much to be learned and as Norberto Bob-
bio reminds us, “the only reason for hope is that history knows long 
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